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DENIAL OF PERMISSION TO "TAKE" AN ENDANGERED SPECIES
WILL AMOUNT TO A "TAKING" UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
IN LIMITED SITUATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that the Endangered Species Act' is over 25 years old,2
it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court in only a handful of cases. Thus,
many questions regarding application of the Act remain. As flora and fauna
are added to the list of endangered or potentially endangered species with
alarming frequency,3 the number of private citizens impacted by the Act is
also growing rapidly.4 With that fact in mind, one of the most pressing issues
left unanswered by the Supreme Court is whether, under certain circum-
stances, the Act can amount to a taking of private property without due
process of law and may be considered unconstitutional in those situations.'
In a recent note on United States v. Lopez,6 one student surmised that the
Endangered Species Act would be found invalid insofar as it is applied to land
use by private citizens because the Act cannot withstand a Commerce Clause
challenge under Lopez.7 The Supreme Court has not yet considered a
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
2. The Endangered Species Act was enacted in 1973. See id.
3. A total of 362 plants and animals were under the scrutiny of the Endangered Species
Act in 1997, exclusive of those already listed as endangered or threatened. This is an alarming
number of possible new listings considering that there are only 365 days in a year. See
Endangered & Threatened Wildlife & Plants; Final Listing Priority Guidance for Fiscal Year
1998 & 1999, 63 Fed. Reg. 25,502, 25,505-06 (1998). As of the end of fiscal year 1997, the
Fish and Wildlife Service had made "tier two" determinations on 156 species, with 145 added
to the list of endangered species, only 11 withdrawn, and another 100 proposed species
remaining for determination. There were also 207 "candidate species" at that time. See id.
The Fish and Wildlife Service uses a four tiered approach to listing species under the
Endangered Species Act. See id. The first tier, emergency listings, receives the highest priority.
There were no tier one listings in 1997. Tier two received the most attention from the Fish and
Wildlife Service in 1997, which is in charge of issuing final decisions on proposed listings, as
outlined above. Tier three is the "candidate" level for those species which the Service deems
there is sufficient information indicating a listing is appropriate, as required under 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(3)(B). Tier four receives the lowest priority and consists of preparation of proposed
or final critical habitat designations, delistings, and reclassifications from endangered to
threatened status. See id. See infra Part II for a general outline of the mechanics of the Act
mentioned here.
4. The Fish and Wildlife Service projects there will be 75 new habitat conservation plans
in 1998, bringing the current number of active plans to 300. See Final Listing Priority
Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. at 25,507. For a discussion of habitat conservation plans under the
Endangered Species Act, see infra notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
5. This question is thoughtfully raised by Professor Robert R. Wright. See ROBERT R.
WRIGHT, LAND USE IN A NuT SHELL 286-87 (3d ed. 1994).
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. See Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: the Treaty Power and
Congressional uthorityfor the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEx.
L. REv. 1125 (1998).
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constitutional challenge of any federal statutes on a Lopez rationale, and in
fact, it declined an opportunity to do so recently in United States v.
Schroeder.8 In Schroeder,9 the federal district court held, among other things,
that the federal Child Support Recovery Act could not withstand the Lopez
test.' The Commerce Clause question was the sole issue on appeal in the
Ninth Circuit's reversal in Schroeder." The circuit court held that Congress
had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Child Support
Recovery Act, after which certiorari was denied. 2
The Supreme Court was faced with an opportunity to consider a
Commerce Clause challenge within the context ofthe Endangered Species Act
in the matter of National Association of Home Builders v. Babbit"3 last year
but declined to do so.'4 Given the Supreme Court's refusal, without dissent
or comment, to consider the Commerce Clause challenge to Schroeder,5
denial of certiorari on the identical issue as applied to the Endangered Species
Act is not surprising. The position that the Endangered Species Act could not
survive a Lopez challenge as to land use by private citizens was tenuous. Even
if the Court had agreed to review NationalAssociation, success of the Lopez-
based challenge would not have been probable in light of the favor the Act has
enjoyed with the Court and the consistent findings by the lower courts. 6
8. 117 S. Ct. 1567 (1997).
9. 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev'd, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
10. See id.
11. See 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
12. See id.
13. 949 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996), afid, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 2340 (1998).
14. See id.
15. See Schroeder, 117 S. Ct. at 1567.
16. See Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw.
1979), afld, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). In Palla, the federal district court found that a
nonmigratory bird, the Palla, residing in a few thousand foot area of Hawaii, affects interstate
commerce by "preserv[ing] the possibilities of interstate commerce ... and of interstate
movement of persons [who might want to study the bird]." Palla, 471 F. Supp. at 995. The
Commerce Clause aspect of the district court's ruling was not appealed. In National Ass 'n of
Home Builders v. Babbit, 949 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998),
the circuit court found that a fly which exists strictly in a radius of eight to ten miles in southern
California affects interstate commerce for the following reasons: (1) five fly specimens were
sold by a botany supply house in Texas for ten dollars; (2) the fly is on display in museums
outside of California; and (3) as with the Palila, people have traveled to California to study the
fly. See Palla, 471 F. Supp. at 995, National Ass'n, 949 F. Supp at 7-9. See also Snap
Judgments, 7 Bus. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 1998, at 6.
Perhaps most important as to speculation of whether the Supreme Court will grant
certiorari in NationalAss 'n of Home Builders and their ultimate ruling, is the discussion by the
circuit court in that the "Committee Reports on the ESA (Endangered Species Act) reveal that
one of the primary reasons that Congress sought to protect endangered species from 'takings'
was the importance of the continuing availability of a wide variety of species to interstate
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Given the denial of certiorari in NationalAssociation of Home Builders,
the only likely successful challenge to the Endangered Species Act, as applied
to land use by private citizens, is one based upon a takings challenge under the
Fifth Amendment. 7 As developed in this comment, it is possible that a
takings claim can be successful in a very limited circumstance.
The most favorable position for such a case would be brought under one
of two scenarios by an individual land owner seeking to build a residence on
a relatively small tract of land upon which an endangered species of animal"
is determined to make its home. The first possibile scenario is where the land
owner has completed the process involved in applying for an incidental
taking, 9 in order to proceed with construction, and has been denied that
permit. The second possibility is where the permit for an incidental taking is
granted with approval of the habitat conservation plan2" being based upon
dedication of a significant portion of the land to conservation of the species.
This comment supports the viability of a takings claim under the
Endangered Species Act, in certain circumstances, by first providing a general
outline of the Act in Part H. Part III is dedicated to a discussion of the case
which presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to review a takings
claim under the Endangered Species Act, and the particularly insightful
dissent of Justice White in that denial of certiorari. In Part IV, this comment
provides a brief overview of takings claims under the Fifth Amendment.
Examined in Part V are the historical foundations which will support a takings
argument under the Endangered Species Act. Part VI provides an analysis of
the position taken in this comment, including discussion of scholarly theories
on the issue, followed by a concluding argument.
commerce." National Ass 'n, 130 F.3d at 1050.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
18. Animal, rather than plant, is the ideal scenario simply because the majority of the
opinions under the Act involve animals. Additionally, disruption of the habitat of an animal is
multi-faceted in terms of shelter, food, vegetation, predators, nesting, and numerous other
aspects, whereas harm to plant life is more or less singular and easier to remedy with
transplanting to similar water, light, and soil conditions.
19. This scenario works whether the land owner is actually able to come up with the cost
involved in preparing the ideal habitat conservation plan in accordance with the lofty standard
set in Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985) (see infra Part
lID), or whether his application is seriously lacking in meeting the ideal habitat conservation
plan because his funds are lacking.
20. Submission of a habitat conservation plan is an integral part of applying for an
incidental taking permit. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. If the individual proposes
to build upon a tract of land that is less than an acre, dedication of any portion of the land would
likely make construction of a residence impossible.
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II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Helpful to an understanding of the takings argument outlined in this
comment is a limited discussion of the Endangered Species Act.2' The
following discussion is not a complete analysis of all aspects of the Act, but
rather an outline of those high points of the Act which may be of importance
in a takings argument under the Act and in understanding the case history
regarding the Act.
A. Listing of Species
A plant or animal species may be listed if it is actually "endangered" or
merely "threatened" throughout "all or a significant portion of its range."22
An endangered species is one which is in danger of extinction,23 while a
threatened species is anticipated to move to the status of endangered in the
foreseeable future.24 The process of listing a species may be initiated by any
interested person, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary of
Commerce.2" The actual determination of whether to list a species is made
after investigation and consideration by the federal Fish and Wildlife Service26
21. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) and (20).
23. See id. §1532(6).
24. See id. § 1532(20). The factors to be considered by the Secretary in determining
whether a species is endangered or threatened are:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat
or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.
Id. § 1533(a)(1).
25. See id. § 1533(b)(3)(A).
26. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a). See also supra note 3.
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on the basis of the "best scientific data available,"27 and is made in the form
of regulations.2"
B. Critical Habitat
Also by regulation, the "critical habitat" of an endangered or threatened
species must be designated at or near the time the species is listed as
threatened or endangered.29 The Act defines critical habitat as the specific
geographical area occupied by the species as well as outside areas "essential
to conservation of the species,"30 but the critical habitat "shall not include the
entire geographical area which can be occupied."'" Critical habitat is further
administratively defined by the Secretary of the Interior, as noted in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill,32 to mean "any air, land, or water area . . . and
constituent elements thereof, the loss of which would appreciably decrease the
likelihood of the survival and recovery" of a species.33 The administrative
definition goes on to define constituent elements in a manner which encom-
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B)(2). The Supreme Court has not hesitated to uphold the
scientific methods utilized by the Fish and Wildlife Service. See also Building Indus. Ass'n
of Superior California v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1997). In Building Industry, the
plaintiff challenged the listing of vernal pool fairy shrimp, conservancy fairy shrimp, longhorn
fairy shrimp, and vernal pool tadpole shrimp. The court found that the plaintiff had standing
to bring the action under the standard announced in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), but
failed to demonstrate that the methodology of the study relied upon by the Fish and Wildlife
Service was actually flawed, and that many experts recommended the listings without relying
on the study. See Building Industry, 979 F. Supp. at 900, 903.
In designating the critical habitat, the Secretary is also supposed to consider "the
economic impact... of specifying any particular area as [the] critical habitat." See Bennett, 520
U.S. at 172. Unfortunately for land use purposes, this provision of the statute appears to be
largely ignored. See, for example, the case of the snail darter, Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Designation of the snail darter's critical habitat was made with full
knowledge that it would have an economic impact in the millions. See Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (by regulation promulgated in accordance with § 1533(b),
the Secretary shall determine whether any species is endangered or threatened).
29. See id. § 1533(a)(3)(A). For 1998 and 1999, critical habitat designation will receive
the lowest priority by the Fish and Wildlife Service, particularly in the context of proposed
newly designated areas for animals for whom a designation has already been made. See Final
Listing Priority Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. at 25,506.
30. See 16U.S.C. §1532(5)(A).
31. See id. § 1532(5)(C). However, much liberty has been taken with this provision of the
Act. Consider, for instance, the abundant litigation and regulations concerning the red-
cockaded woodpecker and the Northern Spotted Owl. See Stephen M. Meyer, The Economic
Impact of the Endangered Species Act on the Housing and Real Estate Markets, 6 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 450 (1998) for an outstanding review of the litigation and regulations over the
Northern Spotted Owl and the resulting indirect costs.
32. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
33. Id. at 160 n.9 (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.02).
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passes every conceivable connection to air, land and water, including
structures thereon and human activity.34 Moreover, of importance to private
land owners is the fact that the area designated as a critical habitat does not
strictly encompass the area in which an endangered plant or animal is found,
but may also include additional areas for expansion of the species.35
C. Taking
Under the Endangered Species Act,36 it is unlawful for individuals to
"take" an endangered species or threatened species.37 The "taking" of such a
plant or animal includes harming, harassing, or killing the same.38 While most
of the words used to define "take" in the statute are reasonably self explana-
tory, both regulations and case law have interpreted and clarified the meaning
of 'harm.
By regulation, to harm is to commit an act which kills or injures a
protected species, including habitat modification or degradation which results
in death to a protected species, or results in injury to the wildlife by signifi-
cantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering. That portion of the regulation extending taking to activities
which significantly modify the habitat of an endangered species, where it
results in actual injury to the species, was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.4 ° More
significantly in terms of violations of the Act, an action affecting a designated
critical habitat violates the statute if it might reasonably be expected to reduce
the number or distribution of that species to the extent that it would be in
further jeopardy, or might restrict the potential and reasonable expansion or
recovery of that species."
34. See id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.02).
35. See Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 160; 50 C.F.R. § 424. Designation of the
critical habitat must be made at the time a species is listed as endangered or threatened, unless
it is not determinable at that time. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
37. See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B) - (C).
38. Specifically, the statute provides that a "taking" means to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt,
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect,.or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id.
at § 1532(19).
39. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. See also Building Indus. Ass'n of Superior California v. Babbit,
979 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1997).
40. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). This action was by logging companies, logging families, and
small land owners to challenge the Secretary's definition of harm because they claimed it
injured them economically as applied to the red cockaded woodpecker and northern spotted owl
by preventing them from carrying on logging activities necessary to their livelihood. See id.
41. See Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 153
(1978).
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Clearly, the actual result of the prohibitions under the Act can be
devastating to the private landowner whose intended use or uses of his land
would jeopardize an endangered species. This is especially true given the
broad interpretation of the activities which would amount to a "taking" of an
endangered or threatened species under the Act.
D. Permitted Incidental Taking
Under the 1982 amendments,42 the Act provides an exception under
which a taking may be permitted by the Secretary,43 "if such taking is
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful
activity."" An incidental taking occurs in the alteration of the habitat or
relocation of an endangered species during construction. 5 Thus, construction
on land which is the habitat of an endangered or threatened species is
prohibited under the Act without a permit for an incidental taking issued by
the Secretary following formal application procedures. Those procedures
require, among other things, submission of a habitat conservation plan and
demonstration of how the impact on the species will be minimized and
mitigated.' 6
While the language of the statute is encouraging to private land use on
its face, the realities of obtaining a permit for an incidental taking render the
statutory exception essentially meaningless in the context of private land use
by individuals. The requirements which must be met in applying for a permit
42. See Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1411, 1422.
43. The exception was described as one which "addresses the concerns of private
landowners ... faced with having otherwise lawful actions not requiring Federal permits
prevented [because of the Act's] prohibitions against taking." H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 29
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2870.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The statute provides that:
No permit may be issued by the Secretary authorizing any taking ... unless the
applicant therefor submits to the Secretary a conservation plan that specifies-
(i) the impact which will likely result from such taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and
the funding that will be available to implement such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the
reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and
(iv) such other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or
appropriate for purposes of the plan.
Id. at § 1539(a)(2)(A). See also Donald C. Baur & Karen L. Donovan, The No Surprises
Policy: Contracts 101 Meets the Endangered Species Act, 27 ENVrL. L. 767 (1997), for a
discussion of the finality of an approved habitat conservation plan.
45. See City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (preliminary
injunctive action challenging emergency listing of the entire Mojave Desert as the critical
habitat of the desert tortoise denied).
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
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to make an incidental taking of a protected species are cost prohibitive to the
individual land owner and grant broad discretion to the Secretary.47
The process is well described in Friends ofEndangered Species, Inc. v.
Jantzen.4" This Ninth Circuit case concerns the permit procedures for an
incidental taking by private corporations in connection with the proposed
development of 2,235 residential sites, substantial office and commercial
space, as well as donation of 2,000 acres of undeveloped land to the county
and state for conservation purposes.49 Before construction commenced, the
Mission Blue butterfly, an endangered species, was discovered on the land,
bringing use of the land under the scrutiny of the Endangered Species Act.50
The county, the three cities in which the land was situated, the land
owner corporation, the developer, a citizens conservation group, and others
formed a committee for the purpose of formulating a plan to protect the
endangered species inhabiting the land and still permit some construction and
development of the land under the Endangered Species Act.5' The committee
conducted a two year study of the Mission Blue and other species, during
which time no construction occurred.52 The committee then developed a
habitat conservation plan, from which it developed a written agreement to
implement the plan." Under the agreement, eighty-one percent of the land
would remain as undisturbed open space, and people who purchased lots
would be required to contribute sixty thousand dollars per year to finance a
47. See id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). Specific data on the exact cost of developing a habitat
conservation plan and applying for an incidental taking permit is not readily available, but it
may be inferred as substantial from the manpower and time involved in completing the process,
as outlined in Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985),
discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 48-61. The cost incurred in public funds by the
Fish and Wildlife Service in merely reviewing habitat conservation plans and designating
critical habitats is substantial. The cost of designation of the critical habitat for the northern
spotted owl was approximately one million dollars, and was $126,000 for the marbled murrelet
bird. See Final Listing Priority Guidance, 63 Fed. Reg. at 25,543.
48. 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).
49. See id. at 979. The land is 3,400 acres of undeveloped land known as San Bruno
Mountain in California. See id. The original construction plan called for development of 7,655
residential units and 2,000,000 square feet of office and commercial space. See id. The ultimate
construction plan is the result of a settlement agreement in litigation between the land owner,
corporation, and the county. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 980. At one point during the study, approximately fifty field personnel were
involved in conducting the study. See id. at 983. The San Bruno Elfin butterfly and the San
Francisco Garter snake, also endangered species, were present on the Mountain as well, but
were ultimately determined not to be present in significant numbers. See id. at 979 n.3. The
biological study involved capture, marking, releasing, and recapturing the animals to determine
population size and distribution of the animal on the land. See id. at 980 & n.4.
53. See id. at 980.
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habitat conservation program.54 The result would be a disturbance of only
fourteen percent of the Mission Blues' habitat."
The committee next prepared an environmental assessment and an
application for a permit for an incidental taking as provided in the Endangered
Species Act and submitted its habitat conservation plan for consideration by
the Fish and Wildlife Service. 6 Following notice and invitation for comment
to the public, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service issued its opinion
that the proposed construction would make no significant impact on the
Mission Blue butterfly." This relieved the committee of the need to prepare
an environmental impact statement, and a permit for an incidental taking of
the Mission Blue was issued in 1983, eight years after the land owner first
proposed to deyelop its land.5" The suit at hand was then instituted on the
argument, among others, that the two year study was methodologically flawed
and that an environmental impact statement should have been required.59
In 1985, the circuit court affirmed the district court's determination that
the issuance of the taking permit was made in compliance with the Endan-
gered Species Act.' It is significant to note that the circuit court opinion cites
a House Conference Report in which the House praises the two year study and
the habitat conservation plan for the Mission Blue butterfly, referring to it as
the standard against which the adequacy of similar conservation plans in
connection with applications for an incidental taking should be measured.6"
While the Friends ofEndangered Species opinion fails to outline the cost
involved in the exhaustive study and other efforts geared towards securing the
incidental taking permit, the cost of such elaborate measures would be beyond
the means of most, if not all, individual land owners seeking to develop their
private property. In a commercial context, the cost of the ten year delay in
construction alone is no doubt substantial.
Perhaps the best example of the difficulty, or near impossibility, in
attempting to obtain a permit for an incidental taking is Tennessee Valley
Authority.62 Like Friends of Endangered Species, the conservation efforts in
Tennessee Valley Authority were backed with a corporate pocketbook.
54. See Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 980.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Seeid. at 980-81.
58. See id at 981. Taking of the San Francisco Garter snake and the San Bruno Elfin
butterfly was prohibited. See id.
59. See id.
60. See Jantzen, 760 F.2d at 988.
61. See id. at 983 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 31-32 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2872).
62. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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A newly discovered species of perch, the snail darter,63 was added to the
endangered species list just before the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee
River was scheduled to begin operation." The critical habitat of the snail
darter was designated as the exact portion of the river which would be affected
by operation of the dam.65
The Tennessee Valley Authority researched alternative sites to which the
snail darter might be relocated in order that the dam could be opened, and
made an experimental transfer of some of the fish to a new location."
Determining whether the snail darter could survive in the new location would
require a five to fifteen year wait.67 After one year, the Tennessee Valley
Authority submitted its plan and findings, but the proposed relocation was
rejected by the Secretary of the Interior, who found that there was not
sufficient evidence to establish that a relocation would be successful.6 The
opening of the Tellico Dam was restrained, at a loss in excess of fifty-three
million dollars in public funds.69
E. . Civil and Criminal Penalties
The Endangered Species Act provides for civil penalties of up to twenty-
five thousand dollars per violation for knowingly committing a taking under
the Act.7' Civil penalties of up to twelve thousand dollars per violation may
be imposed for knowing violations of other provisions of the Act.7' Violations
of the Act which are not committed knowingly are subject to civil penalties
of up to five hundred dollars per violation.'
The Act also provides for criminal fines of up to fifty thousand dollars
and imprisonment of up to one year for knowingly committing a taking or
violating provisions of a permit, certificate, or regulation issued under the
Act.73 Knowing violations of other provisions of the Act may result in a
63. Of passing interest is the Court's note that there were 85 to 90 species of darters in
1977, with new species being discovered at the rate of about one per year; of those known and
classified at the time, more than 45 were living in the Tennessee River system. See id. at 159-60
& n.7.
64. See id. at 158-59.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 162-63.
67. See id.
68. See Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 163.
69. See id. at 166.
70. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. § 1540(b)(1).
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criminal fine of up to twenty-five thousand dollars and up to six months in
prison.74
F. Public Benefit
Congress declared that endangered and threatened "species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people."75 The Supreme
Court held this public benefit is superior to all other factors and rights,
regardless of the cost to the individual or the government.76 The Supreme
Court in Tennessee Valley Authority noted that the intent of Congress was to
prevent extinction of endangered species, "whatever the cost."77
Professor Robert R. Wright surmises that the taking of the property of a
citizen of this country presumably "still takes precedence over the taking of
a bird's habitat under the Endangered Species Act."78 Factoring into that
presumption is the Court's finding that a traditional balancing test is not
appropriate. Thus, the courts may not weigh the public burden of the loss of
millions of dollars against the loss of an endangered species. This is because
Congress views the value of an endangered species as incalculable.79 Given
the emphatic language used by the Court, it is likely that the Court will also
refuse to balance the burden on individuals created by losing the use of land
against the loss of an endangered species.
III. PREvIOuS TAKING ARGUMENT UNDER
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The private property with which we are concerned here is land, rather
than personal property. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the Court
had an opportunity almost ten years ago in the matter of Christy v. Lujan80 to
resolve the very issue addressed by this comment in the context of a taking of
personal property. However, the Court denied certiorari there." In Christy,
the plaintiff leased tribal land near Glacier National Park for the purpose of
74. See id.
75. See id. § 1531(a)(3).
76. See Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 153.
77. See id. at 184.
78. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 287.
79. See Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 187.
80. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub noma., Christy v.
Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
81. See Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 114 (1989).
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herding sheep. 2 The plaintiff endured the loss of eighty sheep to grizzly bears
who strayed from the forest.8 3 His requests for assistance from the Park
rangers were unanswered, and his efforts to scare the bears away from his
sheep were unsuccessful."4 The plaintiff then shot and killed one of two
grizzly bears as they approached his sheep. 5 Because grizzlies are an
endangered species falling under the protection of the Act, the plaintiff's
action was a violation of the Act for which he was fined. 6 The plaintiff filed
an action in federal district court, alleging that his action in killing the bears
to protect his livestock was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and that the Endangered Speoies Act results in a taking of his
property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 7 The
lower court upheld the fine against Christy and found that damage to private
property by protected wildlife does not amount to a taking.8 This ruling was
affirmed by the circuit court because killing federally protected wildlife to
protect one's personal property is not a fundamental right and is not specifi-
cally authorized by the statute, and because the Act rationally furthers a
legitimate government interest.89 Christy appealed the Ninth Circuit holding
against him to the Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied."
Justice White, in his dissent, recognized the importance of the unresolved
issue of whether the Endangered Species Act can amount to a taking of private
property without due process.9'
Christy's claim to such [substantive] protection presents an interesting and
important question - the proper resolution of which is not altogether clear
.... Even more substantial is Christy's claim that the Endangered Species
Act operates as a governmental authorization of a 'taking' of his property;
leaving him uncompensated for this taking violates the Fifth Amendment,
Christy contends.'
Justice White noted that if the plaintiff in Christy was prevented by the Act
from taking steps to prevent the use of his property for feeding the bears
because they are an endangered species, conversely, it would be undoubtedly
unconstitutional for the Act to permit park rangers to take Christy's livestock
82. See Christy, 857 F.2d at 1326.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1327. Christy faced civil penalties of $2,500.
87. See id.
88. See Christy, 857 F.2d at 1328.
89. See id. at 1330-31.
90. See Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
91. See id. at 1115 (White, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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to feed the endangered bears.93 Thus, the dissenting Justice theorizes, a statute
forbidding one from resisting the loss of one's property is the constitutional
equivalent of an edict taking that property.94
In Christy, the property was personal in nature, but it is undeniably
analogous to those situations under the Act in which a private citizen is
estopped from taking steps to prevent the use of his real property for the
purpose of sustaining an endangered species of plant or animal. More
particularly, the estoppel would be in the form of the denial of a habitat
conservation plan and application for an incidental take. Some scholars have
theorized that a taking may occur even in the instance of approval for an
incidental taking where the habitat conservation plan provides for a substantial
land dedication for preservation of the species."5 Although the Court declined
to consider the takings argument in Christy, given Justice White's dissent, the
passage of ten years, and further developments in Endangered Species Act
litigation, the time is right for the Supreme Court's consideration of a Fifth
Amendment taking of real property argument under the Endangered Species
Act.
IV. TAKINGS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use withoutjust compensation.96
Generally, in order to have a taking of private property, there must be physical
occupation by the government or others. While the obvious situation of a
taking involves the exercise of eminent domain in a condemnation proceeding,
a taking may also occur by "inverse condemnation."97 This occurs where
governmental regulations on land use,9" such as zoning laws and historic
preservation laws, so severely restrict the owner's use of his property that no
economically viable use for the property remains. 99 In this context, the
93. See id. (White, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 1115-16 (White, J., dissenting).
95. See A. Kimberly Rockwell, The Firth Amendment Implications of Including Habitat
Modification in the Definition of Harm to Endangered Species, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
573 (1996).
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that inverse condemnation is a taking which occurs without
formal condemnation proceedings).
98. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (regulatory action may
amount to a taking requiring just compensation).
99. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); see also Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Canal, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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Supreme Court determined in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon" that there may
be a taking even without physical intrusion onto the land, which is important
to a takings claim under the Endangered Species Act. A regulatory taking or
taking by inverse condemnation is, however, difficult to establish.'"
Each regulatory taking argument is determined on a case by case basis.
The Court set out the factors to be considered in Penn Central.0 2 The first
item considered is the character of the government action. The second item
addressed is the economic impact of the regulation. Last, the court must
consider the extent to which the action interferes with the owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations for the property. 3 The regulation may also
amount to a taking if a legitimate governmental interest substantially advanced
by the regulation is lacking, or denies the owner economically viable use of
his property."
While the Court held in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission that
development of real property, subject to legitimate permit requirements, is a
right and not a benefit,0 5 even a severe diminution in the value of property
will not amount to a taking if other uses for the property remain."° However,
if property is left without any value because of the regulation, only compensa-
tion must be paid.'0 7
An inverse condemnation claim must be ripe for review under the
standards established by the Supreme Court in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Yolo County.' The land owner must first submit a plan for development
to the appropriate agency. 0 9 Next, he must secure a final decision on the
development which will be permitted,"0 including petitioning for any
100. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
101. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Plaintiff
wanted to build an office tower on the top of its property, the Grand Central Terminal, and the
city refused to permit the construction under a landmark preservation statute. The owner
established that denial of the permit would result in a loss of several million dollars of income
which would be generated by the office building. The Court found that no taking had occurred
because an economically viable use of the property as the Grand Central Terminal remained and
because the plaintiff could build an office building atop other property nearby.
102. See id. at 124.
103. See id.
104. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
105. See id. at 841 & n.2.
106. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), in which the Court held that an
eighty-seven and one-half percent reduction in the value of plaintiff's land as a result of an
ordinance against brick manufacturing was not a taking. See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
131, in which the seventy-five percent diminution in the value of Grand Central Station was not
a taking.
107. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
108. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
109. See id. at 349.
110. See id.-
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variances which may be available under the regulation and exhaustion of
administrative and state remedies."'
If a taking occurs, mere invalidation of the offending regulation is not
sufficient. There must be just compensation even for a temporary taking
under First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County ofLos Angeles. 2
The Court held that even if the government amends or withdraws the
regulation, it must pay just compensation for the time during which exercise
of the regulation effected a taking. "3 Just compensation is measured under the
willing buyer/willing seller standard of the fair market value ofthe property." 4
V. FOUNDATIONS FOR THETAKINGS ARGUMENT
UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Foundations for a Fifth Amendment takings claim under the Endangered
Species Act may be found by analogy to federal wetlands regulation cases and
three specific takings cases. From those it is reasonable to argue that the
Supreme Court has opened the door for the possibility of success in a takings
claim under the Endangered Species Act. This section begins with a brief
discussion of takings in the context of wetlands regulation and then moves
through each of three recent Supreme Court cases on takings.
A. Takings Under Wetlands Regulation
Review of federal wetlands regulation" 5 cases may provide some insight
into the standards which the Court will apply and the possible holding in a
takings claim under the federal Endangered Species Act. A Section 404
permit is required under the Clean Water Act before wetlands" 6 may be
filled."' A few Federal Claims Court cases have examined whether denial of
111. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985). "[Ilt is impossible to tell whether the land retain[ed] any reasonable beneficial use or
whether the existing expectation interests have been destroyed" without a final decision on
application of the regulations to the property. MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 349 (quoting Williamson
County, 473 U.S. at 190).
112. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
113. See id. at 319-20.
114. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).
115. See Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
116. Wetlands are "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water
at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(b).
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
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a Section 404 permit constitutes a taking, the focus of which seems to have
been placed on the economic viability of the property.
Denial of the highest and best use of the property resulting in a
diminution in value does not alone establish a taking."' But, if the denial of
a Section 404 permit prevents "economically viable use" of the property, there
may be a taking."9 Economically viable use, in the context of wetlands cases,
does not mean that the property may simply still be utilized for such activities
as bird watching, conservation, or even a marina. 2 °
In Loveladies Harbor v. United States, the government argued that a
taking could not have occurred because economically viable use for the
property remained after denial of a Section 404 permit because the land could
be used for hunting, bird watching, conservation, agriculture, or a marina.'
There, the land owner had one acre of developable upland which was
surrounded by wetlands, and denial of the permit prevented development of
the upland as well.'22 The Claims Court held that, in order to defeat a takings
claim, the uses proposed by the government must be reasonably probable or
it must be shown that a market exists for the proposed uses, and thus ruled that
there had been a taking.'
B. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles
Three recent Supreme Court cases are worthy of close examination as
they lay the foundation upon which an Endangered Species Act takings claim
may be successful. The first of these is First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County ofLos Angeles.'24 This was an action in inverse condemna-
tion based upon a regulatory taking. The ordinance at issue prohibited any
construction in an interim flood protection area, including the church's
campground property.'25 The flood hazard which led to the ordinance was
118. See Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Ct. CI. 1981) (Section 404
permit was denied, but there was no taking because not all of the land was wetlands requiring
a permit and the remaining 111 acres of land could be developed). See also Jentgen v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); but see Loveladies
Harbor v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990), aft'd28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
119. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
120. See Loveladies Harbor, 21 Cl. Ct. at 158-59.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. See also Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (government failed
to show a market existed for the proposed use of 12 acres of uplands existing in a 112 acre tract
and that a permit to fill some portion of the wetlands would be necessary to create access to and
utilize the uplands).
124. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
125. See id. at 307-08.
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actually followed by a flood that destroyed the church's campground
buildings, and the county refused to permit the church to rebuild them. '26 The
church alleged it had suffered a complete loss of the use of its property as a
result of the ordinance.'" The Court did not decide whether there was a total
taking on the facts presented,' but found that a total taking which is only
temporary in nature is nonetheless compensable during the period of the
taking.
129
First English may be important in establishing a takings claim under the
Endangered Species Act in two ways. First, it is clear that a total taking must
be established under First English. Second, compensation will be required
even for a temporary taking. Thus, First English essentially anticipates one
of the possible arguments of the government in defense of a takings claim
under the Endangered Species Act. In other words, it will not be sufficient to
establish that an endangered or threatened species is expected to eventually
be delisted 3' and that the prohibition against the private land use is somehow
temporary, pending the delisting, because First English requires compensation
during the interim period.
This comment contemplates a theoretical takings claim where a private
land owner would seek and be denied an incidental taking permit resulting in
total loss of the use of his land. Assuming that scenario and successful slating
of his claim for consideration by the Supreme Court, First English may also
provide the framework for a compensation claim during the interim period.
More specifically, the Court may provide the framework for compensation
during the period from denial of the land owner's application for an incidental
taking until final determination by the Supreme Court. Such a compensation
claim would be viable under First English, even if the Fish and Wildlife
Service then amended its decision and granted an incidental take permit.
C. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
The second case which appears to advance the possibility of a successful
takings claim, under the Endangered Species Act is Lucas v. South Carolina
126. See id.
127. See id. at 308.
128. See id. at 312-13. On remand, rather than simply assessing damages for the period of
the temporary taking, the California Court of Appeals determined that the church had failed to
properly state a cause of action under the public safety exception. See First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353 (1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1056 (1990).
129. See First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
130. See supra note 3 regarding delisting.
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Coastal Council.'3' The individual land owner in Lucas paid nearly a million
dollars for two parcels of beach front property with the intent of building a
home.132 After his purchase, a state statute was enacted which prohibited him
from building a home.'33 The land owner sued, alleging a taking in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and arguing that his land was robbed
of all value by the statute. 34
The Lucas Court held that because the land owner had to "sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave
his property economically idle, he [had] suffered a taking.""' Encouraging
to the individual would-be Endangered Species Act takings claimant, the
Court in Lucas did find that there was a "total taking" in the case of this
individual land owner who sought to build a single family residence on his
beach front property and was denied.'36 Also worth noting, dicta in the
majority opinion of Lucas demonstrates the Court's uncertainty as to whether
a regulation which requires a land owner to leave a portion of his property "in
its natural state" would amount to a deprivation of all economically beneficial
use of that portion of the land, and thus result in a taking, or whether it would
fall under the "mere diminution in value" standard defeating compensation.'3
D. Dolan v. City of Tigard
The next case arguably laying the groundwork for a takings claim under
the Endangered Species Act is Dolan v. City of Tigard.'38 There, an individual
land owner sought permission from the city to expand his store and pave his
gravel parking lot, which fell into the city's 100 year floodplain.'39 As a
condition, the city requested dedication of a part o'f the owner's land which
131. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
132. See id. at 1006-07.
133. See id. at 1007.
134. See id. at 1009.
135. See id. at 1019. The majority opinion here is in alignment with the later comment of
Justice Rehnquist in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), which states: "One of the
principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."' Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960)).
Certainly, it serves the common good to preserve endangered species, but that preservation is
a "public burden," which should be borne by the public as a whole by requiring the government
to pay compensation when development of private lands is prevented or heavily restricted in the
name of endangered species conservation.
136. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
137. See id. at 1016 n.7. See Loveladies Harbor, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) and
discussion accompanying, supra Part V.A.
138. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
139. See id. at 379.
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fell within the floodplain and an adjacent strip. 4° The floodplain land would
be utilized by the city to create a public greenway, which the city said would
reduce flooding and downstream impacts."' The adjacent land would be
utilized as a walkway and bicycle path, which the city claimed would relieve
traffic congestion.'42 The individual land owner petitioned for a variance to
be relieved of the land dedication requirement, but his petition was denied.'43
The land owner sued under the argument that the land dedication was not
related to the proposed development and amounted to an uncompensated
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.'" The Oregon Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the city.'45
The Supreme Court reversed, despite finding that the "essential nexus" 46
requirement was established.'47 The Court found that there is an essential
nexus between preventing flooding and limiting development along the
floodplain and creek, and between reducing traffic congestion and providing
an alternate means oftransportation. However, the Court also coined a "rough
proportionality" test for whether the city's findings are constitutionally
sufficient tojustify the condition of land dedication imposed on the permit for
expansion and paving. 48 The question of whether there is a necessary
connection requires "individualized determination," rather than application of
a formula, that the nature and extent of the dedication required of the
individual land owner is related to the impact of the proposed development. '1
The Supreme Court held in the instance of Dolan that the reasonable
relationship was not established, and commented specifically on the city's
request for a public, rather than private, greenway. 5 °
Dolan may be important in the context of a claim under the Endangered
Species Act for two reasons. First, as discussed above, it is probably
necessary under MacDonald for a land owner to first seek a permit for an
incidental taking before proceeding with a takings claim under the Fifth
Amendment.' Part of the process in applying for an incidental taking permit
will likely involve dedication under the habitat conservation plan of some part
140. See id. at 379-80.
141. See id. at 379, 381-82.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 380.
144. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 382.
145. See id. at 383.
146. As established in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
147. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-89.
148. See id. at 388-91. "We think a term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates
what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 391.
149. See id. at 391.
150. See id. at 394-95.
151. See supra note 108 and text accompanying.
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of the land for preservation of the endangered species by protecting its habitat.
Second, the rough proportionality test appears to require the government to
bear the burden of establishing that the extent to which the regulation imposes
upon the land owner is related in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development by making an "individualized determination."
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Although some scholars disagree, the Endangered Species Act can, in
theory, amount to a taking of private property without due process of law
under certain circumstances. A brief review of the opinions against a takings
argument is in order to outline the possibility in favor of such a claim.
One of the theories against a takings claim involves the provision of the
Act providing for an incidental taking permit. " This theory provides that the
incidental take provision of the Act serves as a "safety valve" against a Fifth
Amendment taking.'53 The theory appears to operate on the assumption that
there is not a total taking involved, as there was in Lucas. This theory is only
sound to the extent that the incidental taking permit procedure meets the rough
proportionality test of Dolan, which cannot be satisfied without an individual
determination that there is a reasonable relationship between the dedication
of land for species conservation and the nature and extent of the proposed
development's impact.
54
Thus, the safety valve theory will fail where the exaction of property to
preserve a listed species is so severe that the effect is a denial of the land
owner's proposed residential or commercial development of the property.
However, because the determination is individualized, the safety valve theory
would likely prevent a takings claim in the context of commercial develop-
ment where a substantial amount of acreage is involved so that development
may still proceed after an offer to devote acreage under a habitat conservation
plan.
The effect of the safety valve theory will also likely prevent a takings
claim in the commercial development context because the high cost of
developing a successful habitat conservation plan which meets the standards
of Friends of Endangered Species'55 will be more readily borne in a commer-
152. See Patrick A. Parenteau, Who's Taking What? Property Rights, Endangered Species,
and the Constitution, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 619 (1995).
153. See id. at 622-24.
154. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
155. 760 F.2d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting the House Conference Report in praise of
the two year study and habitat conservation plan as the standard against which habitat
conservation plans should be measured). See supra note 61 and text accompanying at Part lID.
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cial setting with an "investment-backed" pocketbook than it will by an
individual. For the individual owning a small plot of land and planning to
build a single family residence, the financial considerations of developing an
adequate habitat conservation plan will likely render the incidental taking
permit unattainable. Thus, the safety valve theory fails in that limited context,
and a takings claim will prevail.
At least two articles state the opinion that the incidental taking applica-
tion process satisfies the individual determination requirement and will make
takings claims under the Act rare.'56 This opinion appears to be based upon
the fact that each habitat conservation plan is individually created and
reviewed.'57 The flaw here is in the language of the statute itself, which
makes no provision for determining whether the burden of species conserva-
tion on the individual land owner will be too great.' The sole focus of the
Act, instead, is on the impact of the human land owner's proposed activities
upon the listed species."' Consideration of the financial or other impact upon
the land owner or his right to develop his property is not provided for in the
Act. Perhaps recognizing this flaw, these commentaries acknowledge that a
takings claim under the Act is a distinct possibility where an application for
an incidental take is denied."6
In line with the view expressed above, that the preservation of a listed
species under the Act creates a public benefit, one professor opines that an
individual land owner's private property rights are transformed into a public
good in the instance of a permit which has positive effects on the surrounding
community. 61 Thus, he states, the Court does not easily allow waiver of those
rights which have positive externalities associated with them, thus property
rights should be afforded greater protection.62
One scholar said that "the great majority" of takings claims under the Act
will be noncompensable under the Constitution. 63 However, that same
scholar recognizes that because the courts will continue to consider them on
a "case-by-case basis, weighing equities each time, the government is
continuously exposing itself to the risk of providing compensation for the
156. See Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, Judicial Application of the
Endangered Species Act and the Implications for Takings of Protected Species and Private
Property, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,646 (1996).
157. See id. at 10,654.
158. See supra note 44 for the statutory provisions concerning the "minimize and mitigate"
burden in an incidental taking application.
159. See supra Part liD.
160. See Feldman, supra note 156, at 10,653-54.
161. See Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public
Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 859, 870 (1995).
162. Id. at 870-71.
163. See Rockwell, supra note 95.
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regulation of habitat on private property.""' Although it is no doubt true for
the majority of situations that a takings claim under the Endangered Species
Act will not be successful, there are certain limited circumstances in which the
Act will amount to a taking.
That fact has been acknowledged by a speaker in the field, but the
proposed foundation for such a claim is not adequate to prove successful.'65
Specifically, Kimberly Rockwell posits that where the habitat conservation
plan in connection with an application for an incidental taking will have the
land owner leave some of the land undisturbed for species preservation, the
rule of Lucas may result in compensation.' However, it is not likely that a
takings claim will succeed under Lucas where development is not totally
precluded, or so limited as to be effectively precluded.
Relief is available where either an individual land owner is denied the
right to develop his land at all because of the presence of an endangered or
threatened plant or animal, or his development is substantially limited by
dedication of a significant portion of this land under a habitat conservation
plan. The rules of Lucas, Dolan, and First Evangelical will provide the
necessary framework to establish a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment and entitle the land owner to just compensation.
Unlike Christy, certiorari in this hypothetical situation would probably
be granted by the Court because the right to develop one's real property is a
constitutional right under the rule of Nollan. The application for an incidental
taking and development of a habitat conservation plan will satisfy the
necessity of exhausting remedies and obtaining a final determination required
by MacDonald. Certainly, the government may argue that no taking has
occurred under Hadacheck and Penn Central by attempting to show that uses
for the land remain, such as bird watching. But, as the Court held in
Loveladies, the remaining use must be economically viable and realistic.
Thus, where the incidental taking permit is denied, or its granting requires so
much dedication of land to conservation that construction upon and use of the
land is realistically prevented, there is a compensable taking by analogy to
Loveladies. In Lucas, the Court hints that it may find a total taking even in the
granting of an incidental taking permit where a substantial land dedication is
required, thus fulfilling the requirement of a total taking under First English.
Accordingly, the Endangered Species Act, under the limited circumstance
164. See Rockwell, supra note 95, at 600.
165. See Rockwell, supra note 95, at 599. "Since some HCPs specify that discrete portions
of acreage remain unchanged, a Lucas analysis could apply to such a parcel and result in
compensation to the property owner." Rockwell, supra note 95, at 599.
166. See Rockwell, supra note 95, at 599.
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discussed herein, will amount to a taking of private property without due
process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Another line of reasoning against the success of a takings claim under the
Act is that the value placed on species preservation is too high.'67 This
position, taken by Professor Oliver Houck, is that even though the Act may be
too much of a restriction on private property rights, protection of private
property rights to the extent of allowing compensation for a taking should not
be permitted in the interest of human welfare. 6 On the one hand, Professor
Houck's view is in line with the Court's holding in Tennessee Valley
Authority69 in that the Court placed preservation of endangered species above
all else without regard to the financial burden. 7'
On the other hand, Tennessee Valley Authority may be the very argument
against Professor Houck's view because the Court essentially permitted the
expenditure of millions of dollars in public funds for preservation of the listed
species. In other words, it is public funds which would be paid to compensate
for a taking under the Act, and it was millions of dollars in public funds
already expended which were wasted when the Tellico Dam was prevented
from becoming operational in order to preserve the snail darter. In practice,
the Court has already approved the indirect use of public funds in connection
with land use for the preservation of an endangered species in Tennessee
Valley. Thus, the direct use of public funds in payment to private land owners
for the use of their property under the Act should not be a stretch, particularly
in the interest of preventing an individual from bearing a "public burden
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 7 '
Monica L. Mason
167. See Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That
Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings"?,
80 IOWA L. REv. 297 (1995). See also discussion at supra Part lID of Tennessee Valley Auth.
168. See Houck, supra note 167, at 332.
169. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). See also supra Part IIF.
170. See Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 166.
171. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384. See also supra note 135.
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